ONLINE APPENDIX

Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable

Mark Schelker[*]
University of Fribourg, CESifo and CREMA

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Tables

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[*] Corresponding Address: Mark Schelker, Bd. de Perolles 90, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland. Email: mark.schelker@unifr.ch.

Table OA.1: Yearly summary statistics of main variables of interest

Year	Divided Government		Lame Duck		Term Limit		Vote Margin	
	Mean	Std dev.	Mean	Std dev.	Mean	Std dev.	Mean	Std dev.
1970	0.42	0.50	0.27	0.45	0.52	0.50	7.13	9.41
1971	0.40	0.49	0.27	0.45	0.52	0.50	6.93	8.92
1972	0.40	0.49	0.27	0.45	0.52	0.50	7.11	9.17
1973	0.46	0.50	0.23	0.42	0.52	0.50	6.73	7.11
1974	0.44	0.50	0.23	0.42	0.54	0.50	6.89	7.45
1975	0.38	0.49	0.31	0.47	0.54	0.50	9.10	8.87
1976	0.38	0.49	0.33	0.48	0.54	0.50	9.58	10.31
1977	0.38	0.49	0.31	0.47	0.54	0.50	9.81	10.25
1978	0.38	0.49	0.31	0.47	0.54	0.50	9.92	10.33
1979	0.46	0.50	0.19	0.39	0.54	0.50	8.80	8.82
1980	0.48	0.50	0.17	0.38	0.54	0.50	7.85	6.45
1981	0.50	0.51	0.21	0.41	0.54	0.50	7.80	6.67
1982	0.50	0.51	0.19	0.39	0.54	0.50	7.59	6.79
1983	0.42	0.50	0.35	0.48	0.54	0.50	8.07	6.30
1984	0.40	0.49	0.35	0.48	0.54	0.50	8.09	6.26
1985	0.52	0.50	0.31	0.47	0.54	0.50	7.91	6.00
1986	0.52	0.50	0.33	0.48	0.54	0.50	8.38	6.13
1987	0.58	0.50	0.19	0.39	0.54	0.50	8.03	7.32
1988	0.58	0.50	0.17	0.38	0.54	0.50	8.23	7.46
1989	0.60	0.49	0.19	0.39	0.54	0.50	8.16	7.09
1990	0.58	0.50	0.17	0.38	0.58	0.50	7.87	6.96
1991	0.52	0.50	0.25	0.44	0.58	0.50	8.37	6.85
1992	0.58	0.50	0.25	0.44	0.71	0.46	8.50	6.84
1993	0.50	0.51	0.19	0.39	0.71	0.46	8.71	6.89
1994	0.50	0.51	0.19	0.39	0.79	0.41	8.64	6.86
1995	0.50	0.51	0.23	0.42	0.79	0.41	8.80	7.27
1996	0.50	0.51	0.23	0.42	0.79	0.41	8.65	7.27
1997	0.58	0.50	0.27	0.45	0.79	0.41	9.13	7.98
1998	0.58	0.50	0.29	0.46	0.77	0.42	8.92	7.92
1999	0.48	0.50	0.40	0.49	0.75	0.44	10.10	7.74
2000	0.46	0.50	0.42	0.50	0.75	0.44	10.55	8.01
2001	0.55	0.50	0.38	0.49	0.75	0.44	8.75	6.82
2002	0.54	0.50	0.36	0.48	0.75	0.44	8.50	6.81
2003	0.57	0.50	0.24	0.43	0.75	0.44	5.99	5.91
2004	0.61	0.49	0.16	0.37	0.73	0.45	5.48	5.13
2005	0.59	0.50	0.18	0.39	0.73	0.45	5.51	5.39
2006	0.55	0.50	0.16	0.37	0.73	0.45	5.48	5.38
2007	0.49	0.51	0.40	0.49	0.73	0.45	8.76	6.60
2008	0.47	0.50	0.42	0.50	0.73	0.45	9.17	6.73
2009	0.47	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.73	0.45	10.96	7.69
2010	0.49	0.51	0.42	0.50	0.73	0.45	10.79	7.32
Total	0.50	0.50	0.27	0.45	0.64	0.48	8.28	7.49

Table OA.2: Fixed effects logit – Subsamples

Dependent Variable: Divided Government

	Election years		Term limit states	
	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lame duck	0.111**	0.544**	0.095*	0.533**
	(0.044)	(0.231)	(0.048)	(0.246)
		[0.009]		[0.105]**
Term limit	-0.178	-0.863**		
	(0.130)	(0.349)		
Vote margin	-0.012***	-0.061***	-0.011***	-0.063***
	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.022)
State FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
(pseudo) R-squared	0.079	0.077	0.067	0.066
Observations	844	829	1,084	1,065

Note: Standard errors are adjusted to within-state clustering and reported in parentheses, marginal effects reported in brackets. Add. controls: Midterm congress. Significance level: * $0.05 < p < 0.1$, ** $0.01 < p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA.3: Fixed effects logit – Gubernatorial selection & experience

Dependent Variable: Divided Government

	(1) Office terms	(2) Office terms	(3) Governor age	(4) Governor age	(5) Runs for federal office	(6) Elected to fed. office
Lame duck	0.436*		0.451**	0.460**	0.477**	0.468**
	(0.250)		(0.206)	(0.205)	(0.215)	(0.213)
	[0.099]*		[0.100]**	[0.022]	[0.107]**	[0.106]**
Lame duck, 2nd term		0.397				
		(0.296)				
		[0.091]				
Lame duck, 3rd term†		0.437				
		(2.009)				
		[0.100]				
Lame duck, 4th term‡		0.390				
		(1.507)				
		[0.089]				
Term limit	-0.653	-0.618	-0.668	-0.653	-0.812	-0.664
	(0.560)	(0.580)	(0.546)	(0.554)	(0.541)	(0.549)
Vote margin	-0.061***	-0.065***	-0.059***	-0.058***	-0.064***	-0.061***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
# governor terms	0.040					
	(0.172)					
Term dummies◊		included				
Governor age			0.005	-0.123		
			(0.018)	(0.163)		
Governor age^2				0.001		
				(0.001)		
Bid/election Senate					0.072	0.173
					(0.196)	(0.308)
Bid/election House of Representatives					0.408	0.538
					(0.341)	(0.721)
Bid/election President					-0.078	0.086
					(0.293)	(0.383)
State FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.052	0.062	0.053	0.054	0.058	0.054
Observations	1,761	1,761	1,761	1,761	1,708	1,761

Note: Standard errors are adjusted to within-state clustering and reported in parentheses, marginal effects reported in brackets. Add. controls: Midterm congress. Significance level: * $0.05 < p < 0.1$, ** $0.01 < p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. † Three-term limit in Utah from 1994 to 2003 and if a term limit has been introduced during the first term in office of a governor. ‡ Bill Clinton (1992) and Robert Blackwell Docking (1974) are the two governors in their fourth term when the term limit became binding (introduction of term limit while in office). ◊ Point estimates on office term dummies included in column 2 but omitted in the table. Term dummies for 2nd, 3rd and 4th term insignificant, 5th term negative and significant, 6th term positive and significant. Note that only 4 governors are in a 5th and 3 governors are in a 6th terms (none of them are term-limited).

Table OA.4: Fixed effects logit – General last-period effects

Dependent Variable: Divided Government

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lame duck	0.455**	0.462**	0.430**	0.431**
	(0.210)	(0.201)	(0.213)	(0.213)
	[0.103]**	[0.105]**	[0.097]**	[0.098]**
Term limit	-0.732	-0.670	-0.713	-0.713
	(0.561)	(0.542)	(0.548)	(0.548)
Vote margin	-0.059***	-0.060***	-0.059***	-0.059***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Governor resigned	-0.368			
	(0.271)			
Electoral defeat		-0.046		
		(0.349)		
Clear defeat, margin > 5%			0.128	0.105
			(0.479)	(0.463)
Interaction: Midterm congress x				0.057
Clear defeat, margin > 5%				(0.618)
State FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.056	0.052	0.052	0.052
Observations	1,761	1,761	1,746	1,746

Note: Fixed effects logit estimates. Standard errors are adjusted to within-state clustering and reported in parentheses, marginal effects reported in brackets. Add. controls: Midterm congress. Significance level: * $0.05 < p < 0.1$, ** $0.01 < p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA.5: Fixed effects logit – Closely elected governors

Dependent Variable: Divided Government

	2nd order poly-nomial	3rd order poly-nomial	4th order poly-nomial	< 5%	< 4%	< 3%	< 2%
Panel A: close elections according to _concurrent_ vote margin							
Lame duck	0.469**	0.480**	0.492**	0.583	1.336	0.381	18.89***
	(0.213)	(0.219)	(0.222)	(0.703)	(1.144)	(1.333)	(2.937)
	[0.106]**	[0.107]**	[0.110]**	[0.102]	[0.188]	[0.066]	[0.263]
Term limit	-0.668	-0.595	-0.586	-0.380	-0.038	0.107	-0.337
	(0.545)	(0.541)	(0.547)	(0.743)	(0.675)	(0.975)	(2.192)
Vote margin (_concurrent_)	-0.044	-0.250***	0.084	-0.099	-0.074	-0.422	-0.268
	(0.029)	(0.084)	(0.204)	(0.116)	(0.139)	(0.355)	(1.066)
Vote margin^2 (_concurrent_)	-0.001	0.020***	-0.042				
	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.035)				
Vote margin^3 (_concurrent_)		-0.001***	0.003				
		(0.000)	(0.002)				
Vote margin^4 (_concurrent_)			-0.000*				
			(0.000)				
Pseudo R-squared	0.053	0.061	0.067	0.065	0.075	0.134	0.493
Observations	1,761	1,761	1,761	726	558	381	217
Panel B: close elections according to _initial_ vote margin							
Lame duck	0.411*	0.417*	0.428**	0.765**	0.540	0.257	1.619**
	(0.215)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.358)	(0.419)	(0.443)	(0.777)
	[0.092]**	[0.093]**	[0.094]**	[0.128]*	[0.094]	[0.028]	[0.161]
Term limit	-0.532	-0.518	-0.493	-0.040	0.013	0.688	0.136
	(0.532)	(0.537)	(0.547)	(0.753)	(0.757)	(1.061)	(2.235)
Vote margin (_initial_)	-0.050	-0.010	0.102				
	(0.073)	(0.129)	(0.271)				
Vote margin^2 (_initial_)	-0.001	-0.006	-0.027				
	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.046)				
Vote margin^3 (_initial_)		0.000	0.001				
		(0.000)	(0.003)				
Vote margin^4 (_initial_)			-0.000				
			(0.000)				
Pseudo R-squared	0.067	0.068	0.068	0.051	0.053	0.090	0.281
Observations	1,761	1,761	1,761	976	734	525	280

Note: Fixed effects logit estimates. Standard errors are adjusted to within-state clustering and reported in parentheses, marginal effects reported in brackets. Add. controls: Concurrent vote margin, Midterm congress. Results from fixed effects logit models in the Online Appendix. Significance level: * 0.05 < p < 0.1, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table OA.6: Fixed effects logit – Political preferences, party, presidential coattails, political competition

Dependent Variable: Divided Government

	(1) Pol. Pref. (Nominate scores)	(2) Political Preferences (ADA scores)	(3) Party effects	(4) Presidential coattails	(5) Political competition
Lame duck	0.467**	0.387*	0.386*	0.412*	0.518**
	(0.214)	(0.207)	(0.213)	(0.211)	(0.257)
	[0.103]**	[0.085]*	[0.083]*	[0.092]**	[0.107]**
Term limit	-0.644	-0.798	-0.897	-0.711	-1.234**
	(0.541)	(0.532)	(0.546)	(0.549)	(0.559)
Vote margin	-0.060***	-0.066***	-0.057***	-0.061***	-0.066***
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Political preferences	0.326	-0.003			
	(1.181)	(0.011)			
Political heterogeneity	1.059	0.014			
	(1.649)	(0.014)			
Democratic governor			-0.692		
			(0.440)		
Presidential coattail				0.231	
				(0.220)	
Political competition					4.165*
					(2.138)
State FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.0539	0.0625	0.0719	0.0560	0.0804
Observations	1,761	1,632	1,745	1,745	1,312

Note: Fixed effects logit estimates. Standard errors are adjusted to within-state clustering and reported in parentheses, marginal effects reported in brackets. Add. controls: Midterm congress. Significance level: * $0.05 < p < 0.1$, ** $0.01 < p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA.7: Legislative seat shares – Baseline results

Dependent Variable: Legislative seat share

	(1)	(2)
Lame duck	-0.032*	-0.032*
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Term limit	0.077	0.077
	(0.054)	(0.054)
Vote margin	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Midterm congress		-0.014*
		(0.007)
State FE	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes
R-squared	0.182	0.182
Observations	1,353	1,353

Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors are adjusted to within-state clustering and reported in parentheses. Significance level: * $0.05 < p < 0.1$, ** $0.01 < p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA.8: Legislative seat shares – Gubernatorial selection & experience

Dependent Variable: Legislative seat share

	(1) Office terms	(2) Office terms	(3) Governor age	(4) Governor age	(5) Runs for federal office	(6) Elected to fed. office
Lame duck	-0.012		-0.023	-0.023	-0.032*	-0.032*
	(0.021)		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Lame duck, 2nd term		0.005				
		(0.028)				
Lame duck, 3rd term		-0.041				
		(0.081)				
Lame duck, 4th term		-0.011				
		(0.166)				
Term limit	0.067	0.064	0.075	0.075	0.080	0.072
	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Vote margin	0.009***	0.010***	0.008***	0.008***	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
# governor terms	-0.023*					
	(0.013)					
Term dummies		included				
Governor age			-0.002	-0.005		
			(0.002)	(0.014)		
Governor age^2				0.000		
				(0.000)		
Bid/election Senate					-0.004	-0.033
					(0.017)	(0.023)
Bid/election House of Representatives					0.014	-0.003
					(0.029)	(0.038)
Bid/election President					0.002	-0.001
					(0.004)	(0.072)
State FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
R-squared	0.188	0.193	0.190	0.186	0.183	0.186
Observations	1,353	1,353	1,353	1,353	1,353	1,353

Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors are adjusted to within-state clustering and reported in parentheses. Add. controls: Midterm congress. Significance level: * $0.05 < p < 0.1$, ** $0.01 < p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA.9: Legislative seat shares – General last-period effects

Dependent Variable: Legislative seat share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lame duck	-0.031*	-0.032*	-0.032*	-0.032*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Term limit	0.080	0.077	0.078	0.078
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Vote margin	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Governor resigned	0.013			
	(0.020)			
Electoral defeat		-0.002		
		(0.030)		
Clear defeat, margin > 5%			-0.022	-0.037
			(0.051)	(0.061)
Interaction: Midterm congress x				0.040
Clear defeat, margin > 5%				(0.045)
State FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
R-squared	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.183
Observations	1,353	1,353	1,353	1,353

Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors are adjusted to within-state clustering and reported in parentheses. Add. controls: Midterm congress. Significance level: * $0.05 < p < 0.1$, ** $0.01 < p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table OA.10: Legislative seat shares – Closely elected governors

Dependent Variable: Legislative seat share

	2nd order poly-nomial	3rd order poly-nomial	4th order poly-nomial	< 5%	< 4%	< 3%	< 2%	< 1%
Panel A: close elections according to *concurrent* vote margin								
Lame duck	-0.032*	-0.033*	-0.033*	-0.019	-0.050	-0.001	0.048	0.135
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.086)	(0.079)
Term limit	0.076	0.075	0.073	0.075	0.026	-0.034	-0.032	0.138*
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.088)	(0.072)	(0.082)	(0.091)	(0.074)
Vote margin (*concurrent*)	0.007***	0.011**	0.017*	0.012	0.008	0.007	0.012	-0.040
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.106)
Vote margin^2 (*concurrent*)	5.45E-5	-2.50E-4	-9.86E-4					
	(4.96E-5)	(3.12E-4)	(9.97E-4)					
Vote margin^3 (*concurrent*)		5.00E-6	3.40E-5					
		(4.42E-6)	(3.60E-5)					
Vote margin^4 (*concurrent*)			-3.35E-7					
			(4.00E-7)					
R-squared	1,353	1,353	1,353	557	452	343	247	127
Observations	0.183	0.184	0.185	0.064	0.115	0.192	0.367	0.746
Panel B: close elections according to *initial* vote margin								
Lame duck	-0.026	-0.025	-0.025	-0.059**	-0.054	-0.050	-0.073*	0.049
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.031)
Term limit	0.065	0.059	0.059	0.022	-0.003	-0.077	-0.017	0.046
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.088)	(0.063)	(0.057)
Vote margin (*initial*)	0.009*	-0.001	-0.002					
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.021)					
Vote margin^2 (*initial*)	-3.11E-5	9.67E-4	0.001					
	(1.71E-4)	(8.27E-4)	(0.004)					
Vote margin^3 (*initial*)		-2.23E-5	-2.46E-5					
		(1.64E-5)	(1.88E-4)					
Vote margin^4 (*initial*)			3.98E-8					
			(3.07E-6)					
R-squared	1,353	1,353	1,353	735	591	421	307	146
Observations	0.219	0.222	0.222	0.077	0.126	0.189	0.238	0.338

Note: OLS regressions including state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted to within-state clustering and reported in parentheses. Add. controls: Concurrent vote margin, Midterm congress. Significance level: * 0.05 < p < 0.1, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table OA.11: Legislative seat shares – Political preferences, party, presidential coattails, political competition

Dependent Variable: Legislative seat share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Pol. Pref. (Nominate scores)	Political Preferences (ADA scores)	Party effects	Presidential coattails	Political competition
Lame duck	-0.028	-0.028	-0.028*	-0.026	-0.035*
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Term limit	0.069	0.073	0.110**	0.074	0.072
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.051)
Vote margin	0.009***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Political preferences	0.001	0.000			
	(0.097)	(0.001)			
Political heterogeneity	-0.217	-0.002*			
	(0.140)	(0.001)			
Democratic governor			0.101**		
			(0.039)		
Presidential coattail				-0.037**	
				(0.017)	
Political competition					-0.529***
					(0.135)
State FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
R-squared	0.189	0.189	0.247	0.191	0.206
Observations	1,353	1,353	1,353	1,353	1,353

Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors are adjusted to within-state clustering and reported in parentheses. Add. controls: Midterm congress. Significance level: * $0.05 < p < 0.1$, ** $0.01 < p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.